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Strasbourg’s Public-Private Divide and 
the British Bill of Rights 
Alexander Williams 
 
This article explores Strasbourg’s approach to the public-private divide in the 
state responsibility and Art 34 ECHR contexts, which must be correctly understood 
during the design of the proposed new British Bill of Rights (BBOR). It attempts to 
make sense of a number of authorities that are at serious risk of being 
misinterpreted as a result of Radio France v France. The argument is that Radio 
France is best construed as representing a public-policy exception to Strasbourg’s 
general approach in this area, and that neither that case nor the numerous 
subsequent cases to have relied on it fundamentally alter that approach. The 
implications of Strasbourg’s approach for domestic law – including for the new 
BBOR – are discussed. 
 
 
This year’s general election result confirms that repeal of the Human Rights Act 
1998 (HRA) is no longer a distant dream on the part of anti-European politicians 
and tabloid newspapers. Having returned to office rejuvenated with a House of 
Commons majority and acting under a manifesto pledge to ‘scrap the Human 
Rights’ Act and replace it with a British Bill of Rights (BBOR),1 the Prime Minister 
faces evident pressure to press on with his plans. 
The road ahead for the new Government is far from clear, however. Delay is 
inevitable as it negotiates a number of thorny political and legal obstacles.2 The 
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1
 Conservatives, The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015 (available at www.conservatives.com). 
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 The devolution issue is one: Steven Greer and Rosie Slowe, ‘The Conservatives’ proposals for a 
British Bill of Rights: mired in muddle, misconception and misrepresentation?’ [2015] EHRLR 372, 381. 
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Queen’s Speech revealed only a weak commitment to ‘bring forward proposals’ 
for a BBOR over the coming year,3 in marked contrast to the tougher rhetoric that 
featured heavily in the build-up to the election only a few weeks earlier. But 
delay is certainly no bad thing, representing a valuable opportunity for the legal 
community to ponder and debate the issue of BBOR design. Like many I am 
sceptical about the Conservative plans, which are generally poorly reasoned and 
betray confusion over the workings of the HRA.4 Effort invested in debating the 
content of the new BBOR is effort well spent. 
In this article my contribution to the discussion is to offer some thoughts on 
the scope of rights protection under the new BBOR; that is, on the form and 
content of what is currently s 6 HRA, subsection (1) of which provides that ‘It is 
unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right.’ More specifically I concern myself with the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence on the notion of the governmental organisation, which forms the 
basic public-private backdrop to the domestic system of rights protection for the 
reasons explained below. As I have argued before, it is essential to understand 
the Strasbourg framework correctly before any sensible attempt can be made to 
tackle the public-private divide in domestic human rights law.5 The scope of the 
public authority concept has been one of the most controversial HRA matters 
since the Act entered into force. The courts’ treatment of the issue has drawn 
considerable academic criticism,6 as well as correcting legislation from 
Parliament,7 and the definition of public authority is the only aspect of the HRA 
that the Government-appointed commission agreed ‘should be looked at again’ 
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in the event of a BBOR being taken forward.8 Clearly there is room for informed 
recommendations to be made on the public authority issue as the Government’s 
BBOR project enters its newest phase, all the more so since the Conservatives 
have left the issue undiscussed in their plans to date. 
When referring to the notion of ‘governmental organisation’ in Strasbourg, I 
refer to two distinct but related things. The first is the distinction between 
governmental and non-governmental organisations under Art 34 ECHR, which 
provides that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ‘may receive 
applications from any person, nongovernmental organisation or group of 
individuals claiming to be the victim of [an ECHR] violation’. Governmental 
organisations are therefore precluded from filing claims, so a rich body of 
jurisprudence has emerged on the governmental/non-governmental distinction. 
The second is the category of bodies that directly engage the state’s 
responsibility in Strasbourg. The state is not of course responsible for the actions 
of everyone, and is only directly responsible for the actions of core organs of 
state: central and local government departments, the military and police, and so 
on. A private body may only engage the state’s responsibility indirectly, if the 
state is under a positive obligation to protect another individual from them.9 Like 
Art 34, the state responsibility issue therefore requires Strasbourg to classify a 
particular body as either ‘state’ or ‘non-state’. Strasbourg has indicated that the 
same basic distinction applies in both the Art 34 and state responsibility contexts: 
the bodies for which the state is directly responsible are the same ‘governmental 
organisations’ that lack ECHR rights under Art 34.10 Thus, in this article I use the 
umbrella term ‘governmental organisation’ to refer to both sets of bodies. 
Elsewhere, I have made the basic argument that Strasbourg’s 
governmental/non-governmental organisation distinction is underpinned by 
what I term the ‘selflessness’ principle; that is, the idea that the state differs 
                                                 
8
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fundamentally from the individual in institutional terms because it is under a duty 
to act ‘selflessly’, in the public interest rather than for its own ends.11 As Laws J 
has put the idea, the state has ‘no rights of its own, no axe to grind beyond its 
public responsibility: a responsibility which defines its purpose and justifies its 
existence.’12 The principle is theoretically uncontroversial, rooted in the state’s 
need to justify the power it wields over its subjects. Exactly how it does this is a 
complex matter of political theory,13 but the justification must at least begin with 
the state appreciating that its power is to be used for the public benefit.14 
Without this justification the state would be no more than a robber-band writ 
large, as St Augustine observed.15 The individual’s position differs starkly, 
however. It is the backbone of liberal theory that individuals may act for 
whatever motivation they wish within the confines of the law. Unlike the state, 
individuals are constitutionally entitled to act self-servingly, as many will do (by 
e.g. acting for profit-making purposes), as long as their activities do not violate 
the existing criminal law or law of tort, contract and so on. In the exercise of the 
residual liberty left to them by the existing law, they can do whatever they 
please.16 
This piece explores a specific subset of the governmental organisation case-
law that carries a real risk of being misunderstood. Despite the selflessness 
principle being workable and well-established in the Strasbourg case-law, these 
cases are in danger of wrongly being regarded as having changed the law in this 
area. The root of the problem is Radio France v France,17 where a state-owned 
media broadcaster was allowed to rely on its right to freedom of expression 
under Art 10. I argue that Radio France is best construed as a public-policy 
exception to the law, allowing a media broadcaster to enforce its Art 10 right 
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notwithstanding that it is otherwise a governmental organisation. Radio France 
did not therefore change the law more generally, and nor did the many cases 
that have relied on it since. The selflessness principle remains the foundational 
principle in this area. I further argue that this is confirmed by the recent Grand 
Chamber judgment of Kotov v Russia,18 which has so far received no real judicial 
or academic attention on the point. Not only is my Radio France analysis useful 
on a general level, given that a proper understanding of the Strasbourg scheme is 
key to navigating the domestic human rights framework for the reasons given 
below, but more specifically it also has implications for the BBC’s ability to rely on 
the ECHR, which was briefly considered by the Supreme Court last year.19 
The argument proceeds in three steps. Part A primes the canvas for the 
analysis that follows, briefly expounding my earlier thesis on the selflessness 
principle and further explaining the relevance of the Strasbourg framework to the 
BBOR issue in domestic law. Part B considers Radio France, advancing the public-
policy argument described above and discounting a number of alternative 
interpretations. Part C considers the cases to have relied on Radio France since 
the ruling was handed down, construing them in context and explaining why they 
should not be seen as altering the ECtHR’s approach. 
 
A. THE SELFLESSNESS PRINCIPLE AND DOMESTIC LAW 
 
Readers may already have spotted that my arguments in the preceding discussion 
rest on two assumptions about the nature of whatever concrete plans emerge for 
the BBOR. The first is that the BBOR would maintain the HRA’s basic distinction 
between public and private in determining which bodies/functions should be 
amenable to rights-based challenge. This is nothing controversial. There is a basic 
state/non-state distinction in Strasbourg for the similar purpose of state 
responsibility, as seen above, and none of the Conservatives’ proposals to date 
have suggested that the BBOR might abandon the public-private distinction in 
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favour of rendering the rights fully horizontally effective against private as well as 
public activity. Their aim is hardly to expand the reach of the ECHR in domestic 
law, after all. 
The second assumption is that the new BBOR would continue to model itself 
on the ECHR, as the HRA does, rather than containing a brand new catalogue of 
fundamental rights devised from scratch. Again, this is nothing controversial since 
the Conservatives have said as much. Although they have pledged to cut the ties 
with Strasbourg and ‘[c]larify the Convention rights so as to reflect a proper 
balance between rights and responsibilities’, the text of the ECHR would be ‘put… 
into primary legislation’ and the BBOR would ‘not introduce new basic rights’.20 
The Conservatives’ criticism is with Strasbourg’s interpretation of the ECHR rather 
than with the ECHR itself: ‘There is nothing wrong with that original document, 
which contains a sensible mix of checks and balances alongside the rights it sets 
out.’21 So even though the links between domestic and Strasbourg 
interpretations of the ECHR are set to be weaker under the new BBOR than under 
the HRA, the ECHR will still underlie the domestic rights framework, at least to 
some extent, and the imperative to understand the ECHR properly will therefore 
remain. This imperative will be stronger still in the (likely) event that the UK 
remains a signatory to the ECHR in international law, since the BBOR will still 
need to perform the HRA’s basic pragmatic function of providing domestic 
remedies for ECHR violations that would be actionable in Strasbourg. On this 
basis the Strasbourg jurisprudence would continue to matter, even if the judges 
were not specifically instructed to take it into account. 
I also make a third assumption about the BBOR, namely that the BBOR 
equivalent of s 6 HRA would continue to rely on the basic concepts of ‘core’ and 
‘hybrid’ public authorities. Under s 6(1) HRA it is unlawful for a public authority to 
act incompatibly with the ECHR, but ‘public authority’ lacks a comprehensive 
definition. Section 6(3) merely provides that it ‘includes’ courts and tribunals (s 
6(3)(a)) and ‘any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public 
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nature’ (s 6(3)(b)). The bodies mentioned under s 6(3)(b) are commonly known as 
‘hybrid’ public authorities. These are private bodies that perform a mixture of 
public and private functions and are amenable to the ECHR in respect of their 
public acts. This ‘hybrid’ liability is emphasised by s 6(5), which provides that ‘In 
relation to a particular act, a person is not a public authority by virtue only of 
subsection (3)(b) if the nature of the act is private.’ In their private capacities 
hybrids therefore retain their status as ordinary private bodies. 
Section 6(3)(b)’s use of the word ‘includes’ implies that other public 
authorities must exist. These are ‘core’ public authorities, which are obviously 
public bodies such as central and local government departments and the NHS. 
Unlike hybrids they are amenable to the ECHR in respect of all their activities, 
whether public or private in nature. This is evident from s 6(5), which relieves 
public authorities of the duty to comply with the ECHR when acting privately. But 
it only applies to hybrid authorities, not core ones as well. Like the first two 
assumptions, this third assumption – that the BBOR would retain the HRA’s 
core/hybrid setup – is also uncontroversial. So far there has been no suggestion 
that it would depart from the hybrid public authority concept, which would leave 
private bodies entirely free from any direct rights-based challenge in domestic 
law,22 however obviously public the function they performed might be. This 
would be a deeply retrogressive step, even for the hardest of pro-business 
hardliners concerned about the effect on profit-making organisations of being 
subjected to ECHR claims. It would render the BBOR’s scope vastly narrower than 
that of domestic judicial review, which recognises that private bodies do 
sometimes perform public functions and may therefore be amenable to public-
law challenge.23 Even hardliners would find it difficult to criticise Keith J’s decision 
that a private, profit-making psychiatric hospital exercising Mental Health Act 
                                                 
22
 Indirect challenge would be possible, however, through s 3 HRA (e.g. Ghaidan v Ghodin-Mendoza 
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powers to detain and treat inpatients against their will, for example, should be 
required to respect the detainee’s human rights.24 
With the foregoing in mind, a proper understanding of Strasbourg’s 
governmental organisation concept is crucial because it can be seen to inform the 
domestic system of rights protection in two fundamental ways. First, by 
determining the issue of which bodies directly engage the state’s responsibility in 
Strasbourg, the governmental organisation jurisprudence can help the courts 
decide which bodies should be regarded as public authorities in domestic law. If a 
body would directly engage the state’s responsibility in Strasbourg, it stands to 
reason that there should be a remedy against it in UK courts. Indeed, this point 
was recognised in Parochial Church Council of Aston Cantlow v Wallbank, in 
which the House of Lords reasoned that Strasbourg’s category of governmental 
organisations mirrors the category of core public authorities under the HRA. As 
Lord Hope explained: 
 
‘a distinction should be drawn between those persons who, in Convention 
terms, are governmental organisations on the one hand and those who 
are non-governmental organisations on the other. A person who would be 
regarded as a non-governmental organisation… ought not to be regarded 
as a “core” public authority for the purposes of section 6.’25 
 
This is a sensible proposition, not least because there is an obvious parallel 
between governmental organisations and core public authorities in terms of the 
extent to which each is expected to obey the ECHR.26 Just as core public 
authorities are liable under s 6 HRA in respect of all their acts, whether public or 
private, governmental organisations directly engage the state’s responsibility in 
Strasbourg whatever the nature of their behaviour. They are governmental 
                                                 
24
 See R (A) v Partnerships in Care Ltd [2002] EWHC 529 (Admin). 
25
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(Lord Hobhouse). 
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through and through,27 and the state will be unable to avoid responsibility for the 
actions of governmental organisations by alleging that the behaviour was merely 
‘private’ behaviour such as concluding contracts or disposing of land. The need to 
hold core public authorities to ECHR standards at all times therefore follows not 
just from s 6(5) HRA, but also from the Strasbourg scheme. 
The second sense in which the governmental organisation jurisprudence 
informs the domestic human rights framework is via what can be termed the 
‘rights-stripping’ issue. Since Art 34 prevents governmental organisations from 
relying on the ECHR, and given the link described above between governmental 
organisations and public authorities under the HRA, it follows that certain public 
authorities will lack ECHR protection as a matter of domestic law. This is 
confirmed by s 7 HRA, which mirrors the Art 34 test by providing that a person 
can only be regarded as a victim of an unlawful act ‘if he would be a victim for the 
purposes of Article 34 of the Convention if proceedings were brought in the 
European Court of Human Rights in respect of that act.’28 As has been judicially 
recognised, core public authorities are necessarily precluded from relying on the 
ECHR because they are inherently governmental organisations who will therefore 
fail this standing test.29 
The position with hybrid public authorities is less straightforward, however. 
Whilst it is clear that hybrids may rely on the ECHR when acting privately since in 
this capacity they fall to be treated like any other private bodies, the status of 
hybrids when performing public functions is a much greyer area. The question 
rests on a detailed and accurate understanding of the voluminous Strasbourg 
cases on the governmental organisation concept, which remains significantly 
under-analysed both academically and judicially.30 If private bodies become 
governmental organisations under the ECHR when performing public functions, 
then it is clear that they will fail the Art 34 test and be ‘stripped’ of their rights 
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when performing that function. Governmental organisations, of course, cannot 
bring rights claims. But if private bodies remain non-governmental organisations 
when performing public functions, the opposite is true: they will pass both the 
Art 34 test and the domestic standing test under s 7 HRA and will be able to plead 
their ECHR rights both in Strasbourg and before UK courts. 
The rights-stripping issue is an important one in itself, given the number of 
private organisations across the Council of Europe who perform public functions 
and will be keen to know whether they enjoy their own ECHR rights when doing 
so. But it also has important ramifications for domestic law, because the outcome 
has the potential to affect the scope of hybrid public authority liability, whether 
under the HRA or the new BBOR. The meaning of a public function under s 6(3)(b) 
HRA has been much contested, and the courts have drawn considerable fire for 
an unduly narrow formulation that causes particular problems for the recipients 
of services that have been contracted out, from central or local government, to 
private providers such as charities and commercial companies.31 The 
consequence for a private body of being deemed a hybrid public authority is a 
highly relevant factor to consider when determining how broadly to interpret a 
public function. Stripping private bodies of their own ECHR rights is a draconian 
step, and something militating towards a narrower reading of a public function. 
By contrast, the case for a broader reading becomes stronger if it can be shown 
that hybrids retain their rights, since praying in aid their own rights would 
constitute an important line of defence to ECHR challenges that are mounted 
against them. For a private care home operator seeking to resist an Art 8 claim by 
an evicted resident, for example, it may be a game-changer to be able to plead its 
own right to respect for property under Art 1 of the First Protocol (FP). 
While the rights-stripping issue has been little discussed explicitly, various 
academics and senior judges seem to have assumed that hybrid public authorities 
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lose the ability to rely on the ECHR in their public capacities.32 This idea demands 
the very closest scrutiny. It must be proven, not simply taken for granted. The 
idea that hybrids are rights-stripped is mentioned nowhere in the HRA, and 
misinterpreting the Strasbourg jurisprudence to require rights-stripping is 
potentially disastrous for exposing the UK to a barrage of ECHR claims by 
aggrieved hybrids whose rights would be enforceable in Strasbourg. In these 
circumstances rights-stripping would also risk placing the UK in breach of Art 14 
ECHR by denying rights protection on the basis of one’s status as a private body 
performing a public function in domestic law.33 Denying ECHR protection for this 
reason is little different to denying protection to those with red hair, or to fishing 
companies without the requisite number of British directors, to borrow from 
some familiar public-law examples. Correctly understanding the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence is therefore crucial. 
As I explained above and have argued before,34 the governmental 
organisation jurisprudence can be rationalised using the selflessness principle. 
Non-governmental organisations are bodies that are constitutionally entitled to 
act for their own ends within the confines of the law, whereas governmental 
organisations are constitutionally ‘selfless’ bodies that are created and may also 
be controlled – through domestic law and/or mechanisms of democratic 
accountability – to serve the public interest over their own. Profit-making 
companies would therefore qualify as non-governmental organisations; bodies 
like the Home Office, Ministry of Defence and police force as governmental ones. 
This is not to say that a body’s status will always be crystal clear, however. 
Penumbral cases may exist.35 But the selflessness principle can be said to enjoy a 
                                                 
32
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fairly settled grounding in the case-law in two senses. First, it features 
prominently in rulings determining that commercial businesses whose sole aim is 
to make profit cannot qualify as governmental organisations. In Islamic Republic 
of Iran Shipping Lines v Turkey, for example, the ECtHR ruled that ‘the applicant 
company is run as a commercial business and… therefore there is nothing to 
suggest that the present application was effectively brought by the State’.36 
Similarly, when ruling in Ukraine-Tyumen v Ukraine that the applicant enjoyed 
standing under Art 34 ECHR, the ECtHR stated that ‘there is nothing in the case-
file to suggest that the applicant company carried out activities other than those 
which could be classified as a business’.37 Self-service, it seems, is the antithesis 
of governmental behaviour. Second, the selflessness principle is able to 
rationalise tricky or otherwise cryptic cases, bringing the underlying reasoning in 
those cases to the fore. In RENFE v Spain,38 for instance, the applicant was 
created to run the state rail network. It brought an Art 6 claim alleging that it was 
denied a fair hearing during a domestic trial. The Commission dismissed the 
application, holding that the applicant was a governmental organisation and 
therefore unable to file a claim: 
 
‘the Commission notes that the applicant is a public law corporation, 
created by the state… to run the state rail network as an industrial 
company... [I]ts board of directors is answerable to the Government and… 
[it] is, for the time being, the only undertaking with a licence to manage, 
direct and administer the state railways, with a certain public-service role 
in the way it does so. Moreover, the applicant’s internal structure and 
manner of conducting its business are regulated by [statute]…’39 
                                                                                                                                            
3, where the Grand Chamber had some difficulty deciding which body – state or non-state – had 
taken the impugned decision.  
36
 (2008) 47 EHRR 24 [81]. 
37
 Ukraine-Tyumen v Ukraine App no 22603/02 (ECtHR, 22 November 2007) [27]. See further 
Transpetrol v Slovakia App no 28502/08 (ECtHR, 15 November 2011) [62]; Granitul S.A. v Romania 
App no 22022/03 (ECtHR, 22 March 2011) [27]. 
38
 (1997) DR 90-B. 
39
 ibid. 
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Without an organising principle the Commission’s decision becomes difficult to 
interpret. A body can be more or less accountable to government, regulated by 
statute and invested with a public-service role. Whether taken alone or together, 
these factors are all matters of degree and say nothing of how much 
accountability, regulation and public service are necessary to render the body a 
governmental organisation. The remaining factors are also of no real help. 
Creation by the state cannot be the overarching test for a governmental 
organisation given that even quintessentially private, profit-making companies 
can be said to have been created by the state in the sense that they need 
bringing into being under the law. Non-governmental organisations are also 
capable of enjoying monopolies, even over public services such as the provision 
of transport. The remaining factor is that the applicant was a ‘public-law 
corporation’, but the Commission fails to explain what this means. At least in the 
UK, which differs from its continental counterparts by lacking a strict separation 
between public and private law,40 there would appear to be no such thing. 
The selflessness principle brings clarity to the Commission’s reasoning, 
however. The better reading is that the applicant was a governmental 
organisation because it was a constitutionally ‘selfless’ organisation created and 
controlled by the state to serve the public interest over its own. The various 
factors the Commission mentions – creation by the state to operate a monopoly, 
accountability to government, regulation by statute, and so on – are all still 
relevant, but not as justificatory ends in themselves. Rather, they are pieces of 
evidence suggesting that the applicant was not the kind of organisation that was 
constitutionally entitled simply to act as it pleased; to pursue whatever interests 
it wished within the confines of the law, as private individuals may do. 
I spare readers any further rehearsal of my earlier arguments on the 
selflessness principle, which can be found elsewhere.41 The implications for that 
principle of Radio France and subsequent cases are considered below, but before 
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 On which see John Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law (OUP, Oxford 1994). 
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examining those cases it is worth stressing the significance of the selflessness 
thesis for domestic law. The thesis exposes Strasbourg’s distinction between 
governmental and non-governmental organisations as ‘institutional’ rather than 
‘functional’; that is, focused on the issue of who the body is, rather than the 
functions it performs. The body’s functions may of course be relevant – the 
greater the number of governmental or public functions it performs, the more 
likely it is to be a governmental organisation – but the ultimate question is 
whether or not the body is institutionally part of the ‘selfless’ state, i.e. a body 
differing fundamentally from an individual because it is constitutionally required 
to put the public’s interests before its own. This focus on the institution makes 
clear that in Strasbourg there is no equivalent to the kind of ‘hybrid’ liability 
found under s 6(3)(b) HRA; no prospect of a private body being treated as a 
governmental organisation because of the nature of the functions it performs. A 
body is either institutionally part of the state, or it is not. And if it is not part of 
the state, the body’s status remains – even if it performs a public or 
governmental function. Non-governmental organisations are non-governmental 
through and through. 
Two particular consequences follow. First, the idea of rights-stripping hybrid 
public authorities dies in the water. Since non-governmental organisations are 
non-governmental through and through, they retain the right to rely on the ECHR 
under Art 34 at all times. Even when acting in their public capacities they will be 
regarded by Strasbourg as non-governmental organisations that enjoy their own 
ECHR rights. In the absence of any indication to the contrary under the HRA, and 
assuming no such indication in the new BBOR, the same will therefore follow in 
domestic law: s 7 HRA replicates the Art 34 standing test, as seen above. Second, 
the lack of any hybridity doctrine in Strasbourg means that the governmental 
organisation jurisprudence will be unable to assist domestic courts when 
attempting to define a public function under s 6(3)(b) HRA and its BBOR 
equivalent.42 The two schemes concern entirely different issues. Under s 6(3)(b) 
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the courts are identifying the kinds of functions that trigger ECHR duties for 
private bodies; in the governmental organisation context the ECtHR is asking 
itself the prior question of whether or not the body is institutionally private in the 
first place. Whether under the HRA or BBOR, the governmental organisation 
case-law is unable to provide the answer to the public-function question. Its only 
relevance is to core public authorities. 
 
B. RADIO FRANCE v FRANCE 
 
The point, then, is that the selflessness principle underlies the 
governmental/non-governmental organisations distinction in Strasbourg. The 
following two sections explore the principle in the light of various cases that 
might be thought to strain it. This section begins with Radio France, proffering 
the novel explanation that it is best seen as a public-policy exception to the law. 
The judgment was handed down some years ago but its true prominence is only 
becoming significant following the raft of recent Strasbourg cases to have applied 
it. Significantly, Radio France has not always been cited and relied on in context. 
Given some of the dicta in that judgment and the volume of cases to have 
considered it since, it is essential that Radio France and its progeny be subjected 
to careful interpretation. Only then can the Strasbourg case-law and its effect on 
the domestic scheme of rights protection be properly appreciated. 
The applicants in Radio France were a state-owned broadcaster (Radio 
France), its editor and a journalist. They aired a repeat newsflash alleging 
complicity by the former deputy mayor of Paris in war crimes committed in Nazi-
occupied France during World War Two. The applicants were convicted of 
criminal defamation and claimed violations of Arts 10, 6 and 7 ECHR in 
Strasbourg. In its merits decision the ECtHR found no violations but rejected 
France’s prior contention that Radio France was precluded by Art 34 from filing a 
claim. It began the analysis by stating that governmental organisations 
encompass not only ‘the central organs of the State, but also… decentralised 
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authorities that exercise “public functions”, regardless of their autonomy vis-à-vis 
the central organs.’43 It continued: 
 
‘In order to determine whether any given legal person other than a 
territorial authority [is a governmental organisation], account must be 
taken of its legal status and, where appropriate, the rights that status 
gives it, the nature of the activity it carries out and the context in which it 
is carried out, and the degree of its independence from the political 
authorities.’44 
 
The distinction the ECtHR draws between ‘territorial authorities’ and other 
legal persons falling into the governmental organisation category might be read 
as mirroring the distinction between core and hybrid public authorities under the 
HRA.45 Perhaps territorial authorities are inherently governmental organisations, 
the ‘other’ persons that fall into the governmental organisation category being 
non-governmental organisations who are clothed with governmental status when 
exercising the ‘public functions’ to which the ECtHR refers. This assumes too 
much, however. The ECtHR makes no attempt to explain the distinction it draws 
between ‘territorial’ authorities and other bodies falling into the governmental 
organisation category;46 and although its ‘public functions’ terminology closely 
resembles the language of ‘functions of a public nature’ in s 6(3)(b) HRA, the two 
terms are by no means the same. Strasbourg not uncommonly uses the phrase 
‘public functions’ as mere shorthand to describe the functions performed by an 
undoubtedly governmental organisation. In the 16 Austrian Communes case, for 
instance, the Commission held that ‘local government organisations such as 
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communes, which exercise public functions on behalf of the State,’ were ‘clearly’ 
governmental organisations under Art 34.47 
Radio France is admittedly a difficult case to interpret, because various factors 
suggest the broadcaster was a ‘selfless’ body that was created and controlled to 
serve the public interest over its own. The ECtHR observed that the state ‘holds 
all of the capital in Radio France’, that Radio France’s ‘memorandum and articles 
of association are approved by decree’ and that Radio France ‘performs public-
service missions in the general interest’.48 Yet the end result was to rule that 
Radio France enjoyed standing as a non-governmental organisation under Art 34. 
The ECtHR observed that Radio France ‘does not come under the aegis of the 
State, but is under the control of the CSA [Le Conseil superieur de l’audiovisuel, an 
independent broadcasting regulator]’;49 and that only a minority of its board 
members were state representatives.50 Given also that Radio France lacked a 
monopoly (operating instead in a competitive environment) or any special 
powers ‘beyond those conferred by ordinary law’, the ECtHR concluded that ‘the 
legislature has devised a framework… plainly designed to guarantee [Radio 
France’s] editorial independence and… institutional autonomy’.51 
Two superficially plausible interpretations of the ruling can be discounted. 
The first, and perhaps the most obvious given the ECtHR’s emphasis on 
institutional independence, is to read the ruling as establishing that Radio 
France’s independence rendered it a constitutionally ‘selfish’ organisation rather 
than a selfless one required to serve the public interest. Whilst viewing Radio 
France as a selfish organisation sits uneasily with Strasbourg’s observations that it 
was entirely state-owned and saddled with various public-interest obligations, 
this interpretation would comport with the general approach in this area by 
maintaining the selflessness principle as the governmental/non-governmental 
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distinction’s organising feature. This principle has not of course been explicitly 
recognised by the ECtHR, but it seems well embedded in the case-law on a 
deeper level for the reasons given above. Viewing Radio France as a ‘selfish’ 
organisation also derives support from some of the remaining factors mentioned 
by the ECtHR to support its conclusion: that Radio France lacked any coercive 
powers, which are commonly possessed by governmental organisations;52 and 
that it operated in a competitive market, which may have required it to behave in 
self-interested, commercial manner in order to survive. Militating against this 
point, however, is the ECtHR’s observation that Radio France ‘depends to a 
considerable extent on the State for its financing’53 rather than on private profit, 
the implication being that commercial behaviour was not essential to its survival. 
The second interpretation takes Radio France as establishing that the 
broadcaster was a non-governmental organisation due to its institutional 
independence alone. There must be at least some link between independence 
and non-governmental status, after all.54 But this interpretation is difficult to 
sustain because it involves supplanting the selflessness principle with institutional 
autonomy as the overarching test for the meaning of a governmental 
organisation. In particular, this would jar with Strasbourg’s frequent indication 
that institutional autonomy is insufficient, of itself, to render a body a non-
governmental organisation. In Danderyds Kommun v Sweden, for example, the 
ECtHR held that local municipalities, as ‘decentralised authorities that exercise 
public functions,’ were governmental organisations ‘notwithstanding the extent 
of their autonomy vis-à-vis the central organs.’55 This second interpretation of 
Radio France is also difficult to square with the Grand Chamber’s fairly recent 
affirmation of the selflessness principle in Kotov v Russia,56 which concerned the 
status of a liquidator appointed to manage an insolvent bank that the applicant 
had secured a debt judgment against in domestic law. The applicant alleged that 
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the liquidator had acted unlawfully by repaying some of the bank’s creditors in 
full, leaving him with only a fraction of what he was owed, and claimed a breach 
of Art 1 FP. On the state responsibility point the Grand Chamber reversed 
Strasbourg’s first-instance decision that the liquidator’s functions rendered him a 
‘representative of the state,’57 deciding instead that he was a non-governmental 
organisation who engaged the state’s responsibility through the positive 
obligations doctrine.58 
The selflessness principle appears prominently in the Grand Chamber’s 
emphasis on the essentially commercial, self-serving purpose to the liquidator’s 
functions. Although his appointment was confirmed by a judge, the liquidator 
had ‘very limited powers’59 – in particular, ‘no coercive or regulatory power in 
respect of third parties’60 – and ‘enjoyed a considerable amount of operational 
and institutional independence’.61 He ‘was a private individual employed by the 
creditors’ body, which was a self-interested entity’;62 and his ‘task was… similar 
to that of any other private businessman appointed by his own clients, in this 
case the creditors, to best serve their – and ultimately his own – interests.’63 
However tempting it may seem to read Radio France as having changed 
Strasbourg’s basic approach to the governmental organisation concept, Kotov 
renders such a reading untenable. 
The third – and preferable – interpretation of Radio France is as an exception 
to the selflessness principle: Radio France bore the hallmarks of a governmental 
organisation but the ECtHR nevertheless allowed it to rely on Art 34 in order to 
plead its Art 10 right. The fundamental importance of a free media has been 
recognised domestically,64 and by Strasbourg,65 and state-owned broadcasters 
are evidently in a unique position relative to other governmental organisations 
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due to the centrality of informed public debate, and thus their core mission, to 
democracy. Especially since they are unable to fulfil that mission without a basic 
right to free speech, and also that they may be subject – like Radio France – to 
clear legal obligations to serve the public interest, the case for making such an 
exception becomes compelling. The ECtHR also seemed keen to engineer this 
result, explaining that its conclusion on Radio France’s Art 34 status dovetailed 
with Recommendation No. R (96) 10 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe to member States on the guarantee of the independence of public 
service broadcasting, ‘whose recitals reiterate that the independence of the 
media is essential for the functioning of a democratic society’.66 
This interpretation is not entirely without difficulty, especially since the 
upshot of the ruling was to allow Radio France to rely not just on Art 10 ECHR but 
on Arts 6 and 7 as well. There is also little guidance from subsequent cases on 
Radio France’s true meaning. The ruling has only been explored in a handful of 
media freedom cases, in none of which are the facts directly analogous or is there 
any real attempt to construe it. Radio France was applied in Österreichischer 
Rundfunk v Austria,67 where the ECtHR held that a public broadcaster could 
mount an Art 10 claim, but Rundfunk is easier to reconcile with the selflessness 
principle because the broadcaster was not as obviously created by law and 
subject to particular public-interest obligations as Radio France. In Mackay and 
BBC Scotland v United Kingdom68 the ECtHR was content to rely in part on Radio 
France ‘to proceed on the basis that BBC Scotland can be considered to be a 
victim’, but there was no real analysis of the Art 34 issue: the UK conceded that 
the BBC could bring a claim. In Re BBC Lord Reed relied on Radio France to 
support his view that the BBC enjoyed ECHR rights under Art 34,69 but since the 
point was not argued before the Supreme Court this was the only reference to 
Radio France; its meaning remained unexplored. 
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Despite these difficulties, the public-policy reading of Radio France is still the 
most attractive. Unlike the second interpretation discussed above, it avoids 
abandoning the selflessness principle as the overarching test for a governmental 
organisation – especially significant given Kotov. Viewing Radio France as 
exceptional also makes for a more nuanced construction of the law, leaving the 
idea that Radio France and analogous broadcasters are governmental 
organisations for the related purpose of state responsibility intact. There is no 
reason why the notion that state-owned broadcasters can assert their own ECHR 
rights should result in the state being able to disclaim responsibility for their 
actions in Strasbourg, after all. Under Radio France the BBC would therefore be 
able to safeguard its own right to freedom of expression, for example, but it 
would still engage the state’s responsibility in Strasbourg and still be a core public 
authority required to respect the ECHR in domestic law.70 All things considered, 
Radio France is best seen as a fact-based exception to Strasbourg’s usual 
approach. It did not fundamentally change the law. 
 
C. SUBSEQUENT CASES 
 
Despite its exceptional nature, the relatively comprehensive analysis of prior 
Strasbourg rulings in Radio France seems to have made it a popular starting point 
for the ECtHR when rehearsing the governmental organisation principles in 
various cases that do not involve media freedom. A number of relevant cases 
concern the issue of whether the state can disclaim responsibility for the actions 
of a body which is wholly or partially state-owned but a separate legal entity 
distinct from the state in domestic law. With the exception of Saliyev v Russia,71 
discussed below, all of these cases concern what I term the ‘state debt’ issue; 
namely, the state’s responsibility for state-owned companies that are unable or 
unwilling to meet domestic debt judgments against them. The state debt cases 
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are a family of cases stemming from Mykhaylenky v Ukraine,72 the applicants 
being creditors who claim breaches of Art 1 FP and/or Art 6 ECHR after their 
domestic judgments go unsatisfied for long periods of time. An exhaustive 
analysis of the cornucopia of significant judgments to have applied Radio France 
is unnecessary, but the post-Radio France cases call for explanation on a general 
level because of their potential to confuse the governmental organisation 
jurisprudence if taken out of context. Isolated passages from Radio France now 
tend to be cited and applied without proper appreciation of its meaning, creating 
a real risk of destabilising what has hitherto been a relatively well-settled area of 
law.  
Mykhaylenky v Ukraine is at the root of a long line of case-law that risks 
creating a misleading impression of the meaning of Radio France. The applicants 
were awarded judgment in domestic proceedings against their former employer, 
a state-owned construction company called Atomspetsbud. The ECtHR upheld 
the applicants’ claim that the delay in satisfying their judgments amounted to a 
breach of Arts 6(1) and Art 1 FP ECHR, drawing on various factors to support its 
conclusion that the state was responsible for Atomspetsbud’s failure to pay.73 
These factors related principally to the lack of institutional independence enjoyed 
by the company, given that it ‘conducted its activities in the Chernobyl zone of 
compulsory evacuation, which is placed under strict governmental control on 
account of environmental and public health considerations’;74 and that the 
company was state-owned and had been managed by the Ministry of Energy 
since 1998.75 The ECtHR concluded as follows: 
 
‘the Government have not demonstrated that Atomspetsbud enjoyed 
sufficient institutional and operational independence from the State to 
absolve the latter from responsibility under the Convention for its acts and 
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omissions (see, mutatis mutandis – and with reference to Article 34 of the 
Convention – [Radio France v France]…).’76 
 
Taken in isolation, this passage could be read as suggesting that institutional and 
operational independence is now the touchstone for the meaning of a 
governmental organisation. A number of cases have since relied on Mykhaylenky, 
confounding the problem.77 In Lisyanskiy v Ukraine,78 for example, where the 
ECtHR ruled in similar circumstances that the delay by the state-owned Artema 
Coal Mine in satisfying debt judgments against it amounted to a violation of Art 
6(1), it was baldly stated that: 
 
‘as in the Mykhaylenky and Others v Ukraine case (see, nos. 35091/02 and 
following, §§ 44-45, ECHR 2004-...), the Government have failed to 
demonstrate that the debtor company enjoyed sufficient institutional and 
operational independence from the State to absolve it from liability under 
the Convention’.79 
 
Saliyev v Russia involved a similar issue to the state debt cases, despite not 
itself involving state debt. The applicant wrote an article alleging corruption by a 
Moscow official. The municipal newspaper began to publish it but later withdrew 
its print-run following an order by the editor-in-chief. The ECtHR found a violation 
of the right to freedom of expression under Art 10 ECHR, rejecting the argument 
that the state could not be directly responsible for the municipal paper’s actions. 
The newspaper represented the municipality, which in turn was an organ of the 
state.80 Having cited Radio France and Rundfunk, the ECtHR noted that the 
newspaper ‘was incorporated as a separate legal entity and, in theory, its 
editorial board enjoyed a certain degree of freedom in deciding what to 
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publish’.81 Nevertheless, it concluded that the newspaper’s independence ‘was 
severely limited by the existence of strong institutional and economic links with 
the municipality and by the constraints attached to the use of its assets and 
property.’82 It noted that the paper: 
 
‘was set up to provide a public service (informing the population about 
official and other events in the town)… All of its real property and 
equipment belonged to the municipality. The editor-in-chief was 
appointed and paid by the municipality. Although in theory the newspaper 
was allowed to have independent sources of income (from advertising, for 
instance), they were of marginal importance and the newspaper existed 
thanks to the municipality's funding. Moreover, the municipality had the 
right to shape the newspaper's editorial policy, at least regarding 
“strategic” issues.’83 
 
Saliyev and the state debt cases might therefore be taken to suggest that 
independence rather than selflessness plays the central role in determining a 
body’s governmental/non-governmental status. I would argue however that this 
cannot be what Strasbourg is saying. First, institutional independence cannot be 
more than a relevant factor in determining a body’s governmental/non-
governmental status, as argued above. As shown by the various cases discussed 
above including Kotov, selflessness is the underlying feature of the 
governmental/non-governmental distinction. Strong evidence is needed to take 
Strasbourg as having overturned an established line of case-law. Second, one 
would have expected some attempt on Strasbourg’s part to explain why the 
previous line of case-law was incorrect, if its intention had indeed been to alter 
its general approach. No such attempt was made, however. Third, Saliyev and the 
state debt cases need to be set in context given the distinctiveness of the point at 
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stake. In all of these cases the state is attempting to disclaim responsibility for a 
body’s actions by hiding behind the body’s separate legal personality in domestic 
law. Again, in all of these cases, it is clear that the body has public-interest 
objectives and has been created by, is largely or wholly financed by, and has 
relatively strong institutional links with, the state. But for the question mark over 
the extent of the body’s independence, the remaining evidence therefore points 
overwhelmingly to the conclusion that the body is a ‘selfless’ organisation for 
which the state is directly responsible. In these circumstances, the argument that 
the body’s separate legal personality renders it sufficiently autonomous to be a 
non-governmental organisation, notwithstanding that all other factors point in 
the other direction, is the only argument that the state can really hope to make. 
It is not surprising that the ECtHR’s discussion of the state responsibility issue 
revolves around an analysis of the degree of the body’s independence in these 
cases: of course it will be central to the ECtHR’s analysis, because in the 
circumstances it is the only factor that the state can pray in aid. It does not 
however follow that the law itself has changed. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
 
None of the cases discussed above dent the basic idea that the selflessness 
principle underpins Strasbourg’s distinction between governmental and non-
governmental organisations. Non-governmental organisations remain non-
governmental regardless of the functions they perform. For HRA and BBOR 
purposes, two consequences follow. First, the governmental organisation 
jurisprudence is of no assistance in determining the meaning of a public function 
in domestic law. The Strasbourg and s 6(3)(b) schemes ask entirely different 
questions. Second, the rights-stripping idea is baseless: even when performing 
public functions, hybrids are entitled to ECHR protection in both Strasbourg and 
domestic law. The meaning and scope of the public authority concept is a 
complex matter that is unlikely to become any simpler when examined during the 
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public consultation on the HRA’s replacement that is widely reported to be 
commencing this autumn. Framers of the new legislation would be advised to 
bear the points in this article in mind during the process of BBOR design. 
